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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF THE PRESS-RIGHT OF NEWS MEDIA 
PERSONNEL To REFUSE To D1scLosE CONFIDENTIAL SouRcEs OF INFORMA-
TION-A former personnel director of a local Civil Service Commission 
instituted an action for reinstatement to that position, alleging that her 
recent ouster was illegal. In preparing for trial, defendant commission 
members took the deposition of a reporter for a local newspaper. Appellant 
reporter stated on direct examination that his suspicions regarding a con-
templated attempt to fire plaintiff were in part based on certain informa-
tion received from a confidential source. On pre-trial cross-examination 
appellant refused to disclose the source of this information, and plaintiff 
obtained a court order directing him to do so. On interlocutory appeal, 
held, order affirmed, one justice dissenting. Absent a statutory grant, a 
newsman has no evidentiary privilege of non-disclosure as to confidential 
news sources; and a court order requiring disclosure does not constitute 
an unconstitutional abridgment of the freedom of the press.1 In balancing 
the relative interests involved, the duty of witnesses to testify in judicial 
proceedings predominates, under the circumstances, over any right of a 
newsman to refuse to divulge the identity of confidential sources of infor-
mation. In re Goodfader's Appeal, 367 P.2d 472 (Hawaii 1961). 
Assertions by news media personnel that a right of non-disclosure as to 
confidential news sources sought in legal proceedings is encompassed within 
the scope and protection of freedom of the press are of recent vintage.2 
Historically, claims of a right to refuse to identify news sources have arisen 
only in the context of an asserted evidentiary or testimonial privilege. 
Absent a statutorily-created privilege,3 courts have consistently refused to 
1 As noted by the court in the principal ca~e, at 476, since the order appealed from 
was rendered prior to Hawaii's admission as a state, the constitutional issue is determi-
nable only under the freedom of the press provision in the first amendment of the 
federal constitution. 
2 A constitutionally-grounded freedom of the press immunity for news media from 
compulsory source disclosure was apparently first hinted at in legal publications in Note, 
45 YALE L.J. 357, 360 (1935), citing in this regard Siebert and Ryniker, Press Winning 
Fight To Guard Sources, 67 Ed. and Pub. 9 (Sept. I, 1934). In the most comprehensive 
study yet made on this subject, 1949 N.Y. LAw REVISION CoMM'N REPORT 23-168, it is 
stated at 27, that "the present absence of a privilege to newsmen docs not infringe on 
the freedom of the press. Constitutional guarantees when enacted did not themselves 
grant the privilege. The power to compel disclosure has stood side by side with the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press since the enactment of the Bill of 
Rights. There is no more infringement of constitutional rights in compelling a newsman 
to disclose the sources of his information than there is in compelling any other person 
to make a disclosure. No limitation whatever on the right to publish is imposed." 
Significantly, this passage is quoted in the majority opinion in the principal case at 
480. This constitutional question was apparently first raised in litigation in Garland v. 
Torre, 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958), and then again in an 
unreported Colorado case, discussed in the principal case at 498, Murphy v. Colorado, 
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 843 (1961). 
3 Twelve states (Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, Ohio and Pennsylvania) currently have such privilege 
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recognize such claims,4 determining that the public interest in the proper 
administration of justice outweighs any considerations of interference with 
valuable channels of information for the news-gathering media.5 Appar-
ently dissatisfied with only limited success in obtaining legislative recog-
nition of a source non-disclosure privilege,6 journalists have now begun to 
resort to the prospectively greener pastures of a constitutional basis for 
such a claimed privilege.7 
Such a shift in tactical approach is apparent in the principal case. Both 
the majority and the dissent give exhaustive consideration to the relevant 
constitutional precedents and the operative policy factors, with the differ-
ence in conclusions resulting principally from divergent value judgments 
statutes. Sec Scmeta, Journalist's Testimonial Privilege, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 311.,/413 
(1960); Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 590, 601 (1952). Though differing somewhat in language 
and content, these statutes generally create a broad and unqualified privilege, and have 
been frequently criticized as being too inflexible and mechanical in operation. Sugges-
tions for creation of a qualified privilege, admitting of the use of judicial discretion, have 
often been made. Courts have usually applied a rather narrow construction to the un-
qualified privilege statutes. See Brogan v. Passaic Daily News, 22 N.J. 139, 123 A.2d 
473 (1956); State v. Donovan, 129 N.J.L. 478, 30 A.2d 421 (1943). No perceptible differ-
ence in news flow between states with privilege statutes and those without has been 
noticed. 
4 Leading cases reaching this result are collected in Semeta, supra note 3, at 315, 
and 1949 N.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N REPORT 59-100. See also Annot., 102 A.L.R. 771 
(1936). A large number of cases on this subject are unreported, and are collected in 
1949 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT 59-100. See also ARTHUR & CROSMAN, THE LAw 
OF NEWSPAPERS 257-59 (1940); JONES, THE LAw OF JOURNALISM 23 (1940). Evidentiary 
privileges are strictly exceptions to the general testimonial rule, and the preferred modem 
tendency is to restrict rather than to extend them. See 8 WIGMORE §§ 2285-86 (Mc-
Naughton rev. 1961), stating that most of the occupational group privilege statutes are 
"crude in formulation and excessive in scope," and listing the well-recognized criteria 
for the traditional evidentiary privileges. The generally recognized privileges relate to 
non-disclosure of the privileged communication, while the statutory source privileges 
serve to keep the identity of the source of the information secret, with the information 
itself disclosed and usually published. A distinction between the conventionally recognized 
and the statutory source privilege has also been made as to the existence or lack of 
supervisory control over members of the profession involved, such as licensing, present 
in the case of lawyers and physicians, but absent as to journalists. 
Ii The duty of all properly summoned witnesses to attend and give testimony in 
judicial proceedings is recognized as fundamental to the orderly adjudication of both 
criminal and civil litigation, as is a private litigant's right to judicial aid, if necessary, 
in compelling such attendance and testimony. See, e.g., Blackmer v. United States, 284 
U.S. 421, 438 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 281 (1919). Although the 
precise constitutional basis of this testimonial duty and the concomitant judicial power 
to enforce it is not definitively settled (though sometimes held as included within the 
scope of due process of law), history, tradition and logic support the view that such a 
principle is essential and basic to the operation of this country's legal system. 
6 Proposed privilege statutes have been rejected by a number of state legislatures, 
and by Congress, though frequently submitted. See Semeta, supra note 3. 
7 In the two most comprehensive law review discussions of the subject prior to the 
Garland case, freedom of the press was never mentioned as a basis or justification for 
a journalist's source privilege. Note, 35 NEB. L. REv. 562 (1956); Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 
61 (1950). 
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regarding the balance of interests perceived to be involved.8 Significant 
factual differences in the principal case, as pointed out in the dissenting 
opinion, raise the constitutional question more directly than in Garland 
v. Torre,9 and the majority's reliance on the Garland case is seemingly 
excessive and somewhat misplaced.10 Where the identity of the source of 
certain information goes to the heart of the litigant's suit, an arguably 
different situation is presented than when the identity of the source is only 
of remote or problematical importance. And a perceptible distinction 
exists between a situation where the information disclosed relates to the 
actions of public or governmental officials or bodies, and when it concerns 
only the activities of a private individual.11 Whether such distinctions are 
sufficient to present a constitutional issue is not definitively decided in the 
instant case. Rather, the majority adopts a hypothetical approach toward 
constitutional relevancy prior to indulging in a balancing of the perceived 
interests. 
When evaluating the validity of claims of constitutional protection for 
news media personnel in the non-disclosure of source context, initially 
necessary is an inquiry whether, under the freedom of the press guarantee, 
there is any constitutionally-protected right to gather news, as distinguished 
from publishing or disseminating news.12 Despite implications to the con-
B In the principal case at 480, the majority stated that absent an authoritative ruling 
by the United States Supreme Court on the matter, it would be hypothetically assumed 
that forced disclosure of information sources may, to some extent, constitute an im• 
pairment of the freedom of the press. In the dissenting opinion at 492, the postulate 
that news gathering and news dissemination are inseparable aspects of a single publish• 
ing process is readily accepted. The significance attributed by the dissenting justice, at 
498, to the fact that no state court case, with the exception of the Murphy case, nor 
any federal court decision, except for the Garland case, has previously ordered forced 
disclosure of confidential news sources when balanced against the freedom of the press 
guarantee, seems of little merit in view of the fact that freedom of the press had never 
been asserted as a basis for a claimed non-disclosure privilege in any prior litigation, 
until in these mentioned cases. The very fact that all of the previous pertinent cases 
were litigated only on the basis of a claimed evidentiary privilege, with no mention 
whatsoever of a constitutionally-protected right, is a potent argument sustaining the actuaJ 
remoteness of the presently asserted constitutional protection against source disclosure. 
9 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). 
10 Interestingly, since there was no publication of the information communicated by 
the undisclosed source in the instant case, several of the privilege statutes would have 
afforded no protection to the reporter. Significantly, the privilege statutes do not di-
rectly protect news sources, as the reporter and not the source can generally waive the 
privilege. 
11 Differences in the nature of the judicial proceeding, as criminal or civil, also would 
seemingly be relevant in this context, but the public interest in society's protection from 
criminal activity is hardly more worthy of protection than the general public interest 
in the maintenance of effective machinery to adjudicate private disputes. 
12 See Comment, 11 STAN. L. R.Ev. 541, 542-46 (1959), where this question is ably 
discussed. See also Note, 8 J. Pun. L. 596 (1959), concluding that there is no such 
constitutionally-protected right. But see DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 81 (1958); 
KONVITZ, FUNDAMENTAL LmERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE 192-93 (1957), stating that the "First 
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trary in the principal case, there has been no definitive Supreme Court 
holding on this point.13 Decisions in other jurisdictions in analogous situ-
ations have not been uniform in the handling of the question.14 Even 
with the broad scope accorded to the first amendment guarantees, and the 
extended application thereof in varying contexts,15 freedom of the press 
has traditionally been construed as principally a protection of freedom of 
expression, to prevent prior restraints on or censorship of the publication 
of information.16 And even this protected right to publish is not absolute, 
but is limited by considerations of other valid and conflicting interests.17 
Although it can hardly be refuted that total or substantial denial of access 
Amendment provides for freedom to acquire the news as well as to publish and to 
distribute the news." 
13 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), cited in support, hardly 
approaches a definitive holding that news gathering, as such, is within the constitutional 
freedom of the press protection. In the celebrated case of Burdick v. United States, 
236 U.S. 79 (1915), the recognition of a newspaper editor's privilege not to disclose a 
news source was based on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination under the 
fifth amendment, as distinguished from the first amendment protections. 
H See United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954), expressly 
holding that freedom of the press has never been held to confer upon the press a con-
stitutionally-protected right of access to sources of information not available to others; 
Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); In re Mack, 
386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956), in which Bell, J., concurring and dissenting in part, 
at 265, 126 A.2d at 685, stated that "while gathering of the news is an indispensable 
part of the privately owned newspaper business, it is important to point out that 
freedom of the press does not give a constitutionally protected right to gather news." 
But see id., in which Musmanno, J., dissenting, stated at 273, 126 A.2d at 689, that 
freedom of the press "means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it, and circulate 
it." Associated Press v. KVOS, Inc., 80 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1935), rev'd on jurisdictional 
grounds, 299 U.S. 269 (1936); Brannon v. State, 29 So. 2d 916 (Miss. 1947); Lyles v. 
State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958), all supporting the view that news gathering 
is constitutionally protected. The aforementioned cases related principally to restric-
tions on courtroom photography and on the right of newsmen to attend trials. See also 
Note, supra note 12. 
Hi Freedom of the press has been held to include within its protection the solicita-
tion of subscriptions, Robert v. City of Norfolk, 188 Va. 413, 49 S.E.2d 697 (1948) [but 
see Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951)], and the distribution and circu-
lation of what is published, Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Lovell v. City of 
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), and relates to all sorts of publications, including those of 
no social or informative value. In relation to the first amendment freedoms generally, 
the fact that no direct restraint is imposed does not determine the question of abridg-
ment, American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950); it is essential 
not to limit the protection of right5 to any particular way of abridging them, Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); and abridgment of such rights, even though 
unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of government action, NAACP 
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
16 E.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
17 Libel [Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)] and obscenity [Roth v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)] arc not within the protection of the freedom of the press 
guarantee. In other areas, valid governmental and public interests have been held to 
justify some abridgment of protected freedoms, with evolution of the so-called "clear 
and present danger" and "balancing" tests relating thereto. 
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to news information would be an effective abridgment of freedom of the 
press, since the freedom to publish that which cannot be obtained is mean-
ingless,18 restrictions on news gathering differ significantly from restraints 
on publication and dissemination. Sometimes overlooked is the duality 
of the nature and function of the various news media. They are not only 
servants of the public interest in disseminating information of various 
persons and events, but are also private businesses conducted for economic 
gain.19 Although varied arguments have been made to sustain the propo-
sition that freedom of the press includes the right to gather news,20 it 
cannot be seriously contended that news media organizations are to be 
granted immunities from general duties borne by other of society's eco-
nomic components.21 And governmental regulation of the business aspects 
of the news media cannot be completely divorced from its effect upon the 
news gathering and publishing aspects. Arguably, constitutional protection 
of a right of access to information for a special and limited occupational 
class is discriminatory, while recognizing that its work is important and 
beneficial to the general welfare.22 Significantly, other widely recognized 
and universally protected rights of all citizens, whatever their particular 
calling, insure a sufficient access of information to the news media to fulfill 
their news-disseminating duties to the public.23 Though news gathering is 
perhaps commonly regarded as somewhat generally protected by freedom 
of the press, with particular restraints thereon as reasonable to protect 
18 See Comment, supra note 12, at 543. Although literally the first amendment applies 
only to Congress and not to the judiciary, this distinction is seldom made, and it would 
be grossly incongruous to hold that federal courts may with impunity impair constitu• 
tionally-protected rights which Congress and the states cannot. 
19 See, e.g., Snyder, Freedom of Press-Personal Liberty or Property Liberty?, 20 
B.U.L. R.Ev. I (1940). 
20 See THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF nm PRESS 178 (3d ed. 1956), stating that since not 
expressly granted, the right to gather news is 1·eserved to the people. Although this 
analysis is questionable, it would seem that, if accurate, then such right is reserved 
to all the people, not to a special limited group. 
21 See Comment, supra note 12, at 544. News media have been held subject to general 
nondiscriminatory taxation, licensing statutes, libel laws, labor legislation and regulation, 
and antitrust laws. 
22 Questions of the news media's access to official or governmental records and other 
such information, while analogous, present somewhat different constitutional and policy 
problems, and the necessity for protection of news gathering rights in this limited area 
is insufficient to justify any sweeping coverage of a right to gather news generally. See, 
e.g., CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT To KNow (1953). Since it is certainly in this particular 
area of publishing information regarding activities of public and governmental officials 
and agencies that the wisely envisaged press function as the principal restraint on and 
protection against corruption, maladministration, and misgovernment is properly realized 
and accomplished, the instant case seems to raise the constitutional question rather 
sharply. 
23 Such general rights include the basic freedoms of speech, assembly, contract, mobil-
ity, enterprise, use and enjoyment of property, and, generally, that vast area of protection 
embraced within the "due process" and "equal protection" provisions of the fourteenth 
amendment. 
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weightier public interests,24 the existence and extent of judicial recognition 
of a constitutionally-protected right of the press to gather news remains an 
unsettled issue. 
Assuming arguendo some constitutional protection for general news 
gathering as such, the propriety of inclusion and recognition thereunder of 
a reporter's right of non-disclosure of confidential sources of news informa-
tion is dubious. While it is familiarly argued that the gathering and dis-
semination of news are inseparable parts of the same publishing process, 
it hardly follows logically therefrom that the denial of a constitutionally-
protected right of non-disclosure of the identity of news sources effectively 
impairs the free flow of news from source to public. Stating the problem 
as one of balancing the interests of the public in obtaining information 
secured by the news media from confidential information sources with the 
interests of the public in the effective administration of justice through 
compelled disclosure of all relevant testimony, analytically considered, can 
easily lead to judicial self-deception. .Confidential sources are decidedly 
minor in number and importance when compared with the vast areas of 
information available in this modern, open, pluralistic society. News media 
personnel do not refrain from publishing information received from con-
fidential sources because of any apprehension regarding the extremely re-
mote possibility of a later contempt citation. The identity of sources of 
information, as distinguished from the information itself, is seldom ju-
dicially relevant, with the paucity of cases on this particular problem 
bearing this out only too strikingly. Importantly, news media person-
nel, abiding by the tenets of their professional code of ethics, invari-
ably refuse, as a practical matter, to disclose the identity of confiden-
tial sources of information,25 regardless of judicial compulsion in the 
form of contempt citations or threats thereof.26 Journalistic obstinacy 
supplants the need for constitutional or statutory protections to pre-
vent restraints on the flow of news from confidential sources to the public, 
2i See Comment, supra note 12, at 543. 
25 In only one of the reported cases involving refusals to disclose confidential sources 
of information did the threat of a contempt citation result in disclosure. Matter of 
Wayne, 4 U.S.D.C. Hawaii 475 (1914). Source disclosure resulted from threatened con-
tempt proceedings in one other unreported case. See 2 CHAFEE, GOVERNMENTAL AND MASS 
COMMUNICATIONS 497 (1947), stating that "the consequences of threats of imprisonment 
for contempt are likely to be met by obstinate silence or by evasions and subterfuges." 
See also Carter, The Journalist, His Informant and Testimonial Privilege, 35 N.Y.U.L. 
R.Ev. Ill!, 1122 (1960); Note, 35 NEB. L. REV. 562, 578 (1956); Note, 36 VA. L. REv. 61, 
82-83 (I 950). 
26 The contempt device utilized by courts in these situations sometimes embodies 
elements of both criminal and civil contempt, as a means of punishment to preserve 
and vindicate an affront to judicial dignity, and also, hopefully but mistakenly, as a 
method of coercing disclosure of the identity of an information source. Maximum fines 
or jail sentences are usually prescribed by constitutional or statutory provisions. 
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and informants are adequately protected thereby.27 Claims of a protected 
source privilege, then, are not in reality based on the public interest in 
the free flow of information, but rather on the interest of a limited number 
of individuals in a certain occupational group in avoiding imprisonment 
or payment of fines when held in contempt of court for refusal to identify 
news sources.28 Such fines or imprisonment are, in effect, but risks of a 
particular trade and costs of doing business therein. Little altruism is 
perceived in a reporter's refusal to disclose; rather, it is an eminently 
practical and economic question of job and professional security for the 
individual involved. And the professional and economic interests of news 
media personnel seem to be only remotely related to the news reading 
interests of the general public.29 
A realization that the press is the only private industry specifically 
singled out for protection in the Constitution leads to the conclusion that 
this protection is essentially for the people, and not for the press as a 
separate economic unit of society. The real danger and significance of 
the recent case decisions where freedom of the press has been invoked as 
a basis for a reporter's non-disclosure of the identity of sources lies in the 
tacit judicial recognition of some validity in the stated proposition.30 By 
stating hypothetically that compelled disclosure of news sources entails 
some abridgment of freedom of the press in limiting the availability of 
news, the door is opened to allowing undue extensions of the freedom of 
the press guarantee to accomplish primarily economic aims of a powerful 
occupational group, to the detriment of the public generally when resulting 
in an effective denial of the orderly administration of justice. Recognition 
of the necessity of a free and informative press in a democratic society is 
unchallenged. Discrimination in favor of news media, as a certain private 
enterprise segment of society, presents markedly different questions. If a 
balancing of interests is to be accomplished as to a right of news gather-
27 It is at least conceptually anomalous to base a refusal to extend constitutional 
protections on the practical conduct of newsmen which serves in itself adequately to 
guard the public interest involved. Practically considered, however, since the public 
interest is the only feasible basis for granting a constitutionally-protected right of non• 
disclosure to newsmen, and this is otherwise adequately insured, the anomaly pales in the 
light of applied experience. 
28 See Comment, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 243, 247-48 (1959). 
29 Seemingly, more flexible use of the contempt device can achieve propitious results, 
while avoiding the public expense of keeping unanswering reporters in jail unnecessarily. 
Allowance of judicial discretion in utilizing the money paid as fines partially to recompense 
parties effectively denied recoveries, to which they would otherwise apparently be en• 
titled, may have some merit as a possible remedial device. 
ao In the Garland case, at 549-50, the court intimated that a different question might 
be presented if the judicial process were being used to force a wholesale disclosure of 
confidential news sources, or where the identity of the news source is of doubtful relevance 
or materiality, with Judge Stewart writing the opinion; Mr. Justice Douglas favored 
granting of certiorari in both the Garland and the Murphy cases. 
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ing, if judicially recognized, it is necessarily a balancing at a different and 
lower level than that done in regard to the right to disseminate news, 
since it inevitably involves some discrimination in granting and protecting 
the right of access to certain information. Acceptance of the proposition 
that a right to gather news generally, if constitutionally protected, em-
braces within its scope a right of non-disclosure as to the identity of 
confidential sources of information, without a close analysis of its prag-
matic validity, will seemingly result in situations in which any rights as-
serted to be constitutionally protected, though raised in only a most 
attenuated and distant fashion, are brought into the main stream of first 
amendment freedoms' litigation, with all the weighing, balancing and pre-
ferring attendant thereto. When the basic interests of an orderly society 
conflict with protected individual rights and freedoms, balancing of these 
considerations provides the only rational solution. But prior to indulging 
in any such balancing, it is essential that a basic conflict actually be pre-
sented. Extensions of basic freedoms beyond their proper and necessary 
scope, with little or no perceptible public benefit therefrom, is a dangerous 
and unwise course to follow, easily leading to a gradual watering down 
and erosion of the essence of these protected liberties. 
Francis X. Beytagh, Jr., S.Ed. 
